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I. NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant asserts that application of the 2001 and subsequent amendments to IDAHO
CODE § 18-8301 (1 ) (definition of "aggravated offense") and IDAHO CODE § 18-8310(1)
(precluding offender convicted of an aggravated offense from relief from sex offender
registration requirements) in his case amount to retroactive application of those amendments in
violation ofIDAHO CODE § 73-101, which states "[n]o part of these compiled laws is retroactive,
unless expressly so declared."

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As set forth in the Brief of Appellant, Appellant was sentenced for the sex offense of
Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child, IDAHO CODE § 18-1508, on July 29, 1991. At the time of
Appellant's sentencing there was no sex offender registration requirement in Idaho. In 1993, the
Idaho legislature passed the Sex Offender Registration Act. This act required sex offenders to
register for a period often years after discharge from probation, parole or release from
incarceration, whichever was greater. It also allowed for expungement of the sex offender
registration requirements at the end of that period of time, provided that the sex offender showed
by clear and convincing evidence that his duty to register had expired, he did not have a criminal
charge pending nor was under criminal investigation for any crime identified as one requiring
sex offender registration, and that he was not a substantial risk to commit a new sex offense.
1993 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 155.
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As Appellant recites, in 1998 the Idaho legislature repealed the 1993 Sex Offender
Registration Act and replaced it with the Sexual Offender Registration Notification and
Community Right-to-Know Act (hereafter "Act"). 1998 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 411. Like its
predecessor, this Act applied to convicted sex offenders who were on probation, as was
Appellant, for a sex offense that required registration as of July 1, 1993. As codified, IDAHO
CODE § 18-8301 (1) allowed a registered sex offender to petition to be released from the
registration requirements after ten years from the date the offender was released from
incarceration or placed on parole, supervised release or probation, whichever was greater.
In 2001, the Act was again amended. It added the definition of "aggravated offense" to
IDAHO CODE § 18-8303 in relevant part as follows:
[alggravated offense" means any of the following crimes as set forth in section
18-8304, IDAHO CODE: 18-1508 (lewd conduct when the victim is less that twelve
(12) years of age); ... [Emphasis added]
2001 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 194.
The 2001 amendments to the Act also amended IDAHO CODE § 18-8310(1) to preclude
sex offenders convicted of an aggravated offense from eligibility for release from Idaho's sex
offender registration requirements:
Any person, other than a recidivist, an offender who has been convicted of an
aggravated offense, or an offender designated as a violent sexual predator, may,
after a period of ten (10) years from the date the person was released from
incarceration or placed on parole, supervised release or probation, whichever is
greater, petition the district court for a show cause hearing to determine whether
the person shall be exempted from the duty to register as a sexual offender.
[Emphasis added]
2001 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 194.
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Thus, as of July 1,2001, when these amendments took effect, sex offenders convicted of
an aggravated offense are not eligible for release from the sex offender registration requirements.

On June 15,2011, Appellant filed a Petition to Be Released From Sex Offender
Registration Requirements in the First Judicial District Court for the State of Idaho, Kootenai
County. Clerk's Record ("CR"), p. 1. On June 24, 2011, the Idaho State Police, Bureau of
Criminal Identification, filed a Notice and Affidavit of Ineligibility of Release from Sex
Offender Registry. CR, p. 18. Based on the applicable statutory language and the information
provided in the Affidavit, the district court specifically found that Appellant's "petition is not
sufficient, due to the fact that he has been convicted of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child Under
the Age of Sixteen, a violation of IDAHO CODE § 18-1508, and under present statutory language,
specifically, IDAHO CODE § 18-8303(1), that offense is not one in for which a petition to be
exempted from the duty to register as a sexual offender may be made." CR, p. 23.

III. ISSUE ON APPEAL
The issue on appeal is whether the application of the 2001 and subsequent amendments to
IDAHO CODE § 18-8301 (1 ) (definition of "aggravated offense") and IDAHO CODE § 18-8310(1)
(precluding offender convicted of an aggravated offense from relief from sex offender
registration requirements) in his case amount to retroactive application of those amendments in
violation of IDAHO CODE § 73-101.
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IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free
review." Smith v. Washington County Idaho, 150 Idaho 388, 247 P.3d 615,617 (2010), citing

Doe v. Boy Scouts ofAm., 148 Idaho 427,430,224 P.3d 494, 497 (2009). "When [this] Court
must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent, and give
effect to that intent." State v. Forbes, 152 Idaho 849,275 P.3d 864, 866 (2012), citing State v.

Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685,688 (1999).
Whether a law is civil or criminal is a matter of statutory construction. State v. Johnson,
152 Idaho 41, 266 P.3d 1146 (2011) citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84,92,123 S.Ct. 1140 (2003).
"Where a legislative restriction 'is an incident of the State's power to protect the health and
safety of its citizens,' it will be considered 'as evidencing an intent to exercise that regulatory
power, and not a purpose to add to the punishment.' " Id. at 93-94, 123 S.Ct at 1147 .
V. ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS
IDAHO CODE § 73-101 states "[n]o part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless
expressly so declared." In support of his argument before the district court, Appellant cited to
footnote 1 from Overman v. Overman, 102 Idaho 235, 237 (1980), and Unity Light & Power Co.

v. City of Burley, 92 Idaho 499, 504 (1968), cited for the proposition that" ... unless a contrary
intention clearly appears therein, a statute will not be given retrospective effect." Respondent
does not quarrel with this most basic interpretation OfIDAHO CODE § 73-101, but knows that it
does not apply in that way to Appellant's request to be relieved from Idaho's sex offender
registration requirements.
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The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently recognized "that where a statute is procedural
or merely 'draws upon facts antecedent to its enactment' it will be held to be prospective in
nature." Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 43, 232 P.3d 813, 821 (2010), citing Bryant v. City of

Blaclifoot, 137 Idaho 307, 313, 48 P.3d 636, 642 (2002).
In Stuart, the Court examined the application of IDAHO CODE § 19-2719, which although
it "included language making it applicable to convictions prior to the statute's enactment, but it
was not, itself, 'retroactive' in any substantive sense." Stuart, 149 Idaho at 43,232 P.3d at 821.
The Court continued:
Because I.e. § 19-2719 applies to post-conviction relief actions rather than the
underlying criminal actions, its application is prospective - operating on all postconviction petitions submitted after the effective date of the statute. See, e.g.
Esquivel v. State, 128 Idaho 390,392, 913 P.2d 1160, 1162 (1996) (applying the
reduced one-year statute of limitations in non-capital post-conviction proceedings
prospectively from the date of enactment and finding no violation of I.C. § 73101.

Stuart, 149 Idaho at 43,232 P.3d at 821 (underlined emphasis added).
Appellant in the present is in a position similar to Stuart. The relevant amendments
began to apply upon their enactment to registered sex offenders who attempted after their
enactment, prospectively, to be released from sex offender registration requirements. Therefore,
they are not retroactive and do not run afoul of IDAHO CODE § 73-101.
There is another reason that the relevant amendments are not retroactive. "[I]n the
absence of an express declaration of legislative intent, a statute, which is remedial or procedural
in nature, and which does not create, enlarge, diminish, or destroy contractual or vested rights, is
generally held not to be retroactive, even though it was enacted subsequent to the events to
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which it applies. Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 262, 207 P.3d
988,993 (2009), citing Gailey v. Jerome County, 113 Idaho 430,432, 745 P.2d 1051, 1054
(1987).
Idaho's sex offender registration laws and their subsequent amendments did not and do
not apply retroactively to Appellant because he has never had a contractual or vested right to
petition the court for release from the sexual offender registration requirements. Ten years had
not elapsed from the date he was placed on probation (July 29, 1991) before the sex offender
registration laws were amended in 2001 and became effective on July 1,2001. See IDAHO CODE
§ 18-8310 (1); Esquivel v. State, 128 Idaho 390, 913 P.2d 1160 (1996) (holding application of
amended version ofIDAHO CODE § 19-4902, which reduced the time to file a post-conviction
petition from five years to one year, was proper, and not retroactive); Bryant v. City of Blaclifoot,
137 Idaho 307,313,48 P.3d 636, 642 (2002). ("A statute is not made retroactive merely because
it draws upon facts antecedent to its enactment. ... Changes in procedural laws are held
applicable to existing causes of action because the effect of such statutes is actually prospective
in nature since they relate to the procedure to be followed in the future. "); University of Utah
Hospital v. Pence, 104 Idaho 172, 657 P.2d 459 (1982) (same).
The relevant amendments to Idaho's sex offender registration laws relate to the
procedures to be followed in the future from their enactment in determining whether a registered
sex offender is eligible for release from registration under IDAHO CODE § 18-8310. As having
been convicted of an aggravated offense, Petitioner is not eligible for such release.
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As further compelling reasoning that the application of Idaho's sex offender registration
laws are not retroactive are Idaho Supreme Court cases that examined the issue of retroactivity
under Ex Post Facto clause analysis. In Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96,98-99,982 P.2d 931, 933934 (1999), the Idaho Supreme Court considered Ray's post-conviction claim that his guilty plea
to sex abuse of a minor under sixteen was involuntary due to trial counsel's failure to inform
him, before his plea, that he would be required to register as a sex offender. Ray argued on
appeal that "the sex offender requirement [was] a direct consequence of his guilty plea and thus,
the district judge, by failing to notify him of the requirement, violated Idaho Criminal Rule
(I.C.R.) 11(c) and his guilty plea [was] thus invalid." Id. at 99,982 P.2d at 934. The Idaho
Supreme Court disagreed. It found the "purpose ofIdaho's registration statute is not punitive,
but remedial." Id. at 100,982 P.2d at 935. See, Wheeler, 147 Idaho at 262,207 P.3d at 993 (a
statute, which is remedial or procedural in nature .. .is generally held not to be retroactive, even
though it was enacted subsequent to the events to which it applies).
The Court concluded that the statute "provides an essential regulatory purpose that assists
law enforcement and parents in protecting children and communities." Ray v. State, 133 Idaho
96 at 101,982 P.2d at 936. Accordingly, the Court held that "sex offender registration is a
collateral, not direct, consequence of pleading guilty." Jd.; State v. Joslin, 145 Idaho 75, 86,175
P.3d 764, 775 (2007) (sex offender registration requirement is not cruel and unusual punishment
under the state constitution because "[t]he requirement that sexual offenders register does not
impose punishment").
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Four years after Ray, the United States Supreme Court similarly held that Alaska's sex
offender registration requirements were not punishment. In Smith v. Doe I, 538 U.S. 84, 92-93,
123 S.Ct 1140, (2003), the United States Supreme Court considered whether the Alaska Sex
Offender Registration Act, which is similar to Idaho's, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court held it did not.
Similar to the 2001 amendment of Idaho's sex offender registration laws, after Alaska's
sex offender registration act was first enacted (in 1994), it was subsequently amended (in 1998)
to make its registration provisions continue for life (instead of fifteen years) for sex offenders
convicted of an "aggravated sex offense." 1998 Alaska Sess. Laws Ch. 106 (codified in Alaska
Stat. § 12.63.020(a)(l». With regard to Alaska's lifetime registration requirement for
aggravated offenses, the United States Supreme Court opined:
The [Ninth Circuit] Court of Appeals was incorrect to conclude that the Act's
registration obligations were retributive because "the length of the reporting
requirement appears to be measured by the extent of the wrongdoing, not by the
extent of the risk posed." 259 F.3d 90. The Act, it is true, differentiates between
individuals convicted of aggravated or multiple offenses and those convicted of a
single non aggravated offense. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.020(a)(l) (2000). The broad
categories, however, and the corresponding length of the reporting requirement,
are reasonably related to the danger of recidivism, and this is consistent with the
regulatory objective.
Doe 1,538 U.S. at 104.
This Court's recent decisions in State v. Hardwick, 150 Idaho 580, 249 P.3d 379 (2011)
and State v. Forbes, 275 P.3d 864 (2012) remain consistent with its previous holdings regarding
application of a remedial statute. In both cases, this Court considered whether retroactive
application of an amendment to IDAHO CODE § 19-2604(3), which prohibits dismissal of offenses
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requiring sex offender registration, violated the ex post facto clauses of the United States
Constitution and the Idaho Constitution. In each of those cases, the Court examined the
Legislature's purpose for requiring sex offender legislation at IDAHO CODE § 18-8302:
The legislature finds that sexual offenders present a danger and that efforts
of law enforcement agencies to protect their communities, conduct
investigations and quickly apprehend offenders who commit sexual
offenses are impaired by the lack of current information available about
individuals who have been convicted of sexual offenses who live within
their jurisdiction. The legislature further finds that providing public access
to certain information about convicted sexual offenders assists parents in
the protection of their children. Such access further provides a means for
organizations that work with youth or other vulnerable populations to
prevent sexual offenders from threatening those served by the
organizations. Finally, public access assists the community in being
observant of convicted sexual offenders in order to prevent them from
recommitting sexual crimes. Therefore, this state's policy is to assist
efforts of local law enforcement agencies to protect communities by
requiring sexual offenders to register with local law enforcement agencies
and to make certain information about sexual offenders available to the
public as provided in this chapter.
Acknowledging this non-punitive purpose, the Court held that retroactive application of
the July 1,2006 amendment to IDAHO CODE § 19-2604(3) that a "judgment of conviction for a
violation of any offense requiring sex offender registration as set forth in Section 18-8304, Idaho
Code, shall not be subject to dismissal or reduction under this section" did not violate the ex post
facto clauses of the United States or Idaho Constitutions because this amendment was not
punitive. Although IDAHO CODE § 73-101, was raised in Forbes, the Court analysis in that case
focused on the Ex Post Facto question. Nevertheless, Hardwick and Forbes are certainly
instructive as the Court decides Appellant's IDAHO CODE § 73-101 retroactive application issue.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Page 9

Finally, and also compelling for IDAHO CODE § 73-101 analysis, is State v. Johnson, 152
Idaho 41, 266 P .3d 1146 (2011). There, although in dicta, this Court emphasized:
Because SORA [the Sex Offender Registration Act] as a whole is regulatory in
purpose, there is no reason to infer that the Legislature intended these "technical
amendments and updates" as anything other than civil and nonpunitive. In order
for the 2009 SORA amendments to violate the ex post Jacto clause, despite their
civil denomination, we would have to determine that they are nonetheless
punitive.
In this regard, Johnson highlights the fact that the 2009 amendments would
forever preclude him from petitioning for exemption despite the apparent
likelihood that he will not reoffend. The test that we must apply, however, focuses
on whether the challenged statute is, "by the clearest proof," so punitive as to
override the Legislature'S regulatory purpose. Doe, 538 U.S. at 92, 123 S.Ct. at
1146-47, 155 L.Ed.2d at 176. "The Ex Post Facto Clause does not preclude a
State from making reasonable categorical judgments that conviction of specified
crimes should entail particular regulatory consequences." Id at 103, 123 S.Ct. at
1153, 115 L.Ed.2d at 194. The U.S. Supreme Court has dismissed ex post Jacto
claims "imposing regulatory burdens on individuals convicted of crimes without
any corresponding risk assessment." Id, at 104, 123 S.Ct. at 1153, 155 L.Ed at
184. Moreover, "[t]he State's determination to legislate with respect to convicted
sex offenders as a class, rather than require individual determination of their
dangerousness, does not make the statute a punishment under the Ex Post Facto
Clause." Id The fact that a sexual offender, convicted of a certain class of crime,
may be required to register for life is not so punitive that it overrides SORA's
regulatory purpose. This is particularly so because the Legislature need not make
particularized findings in the regulatory context.
Johnson, 266 P.3d at 1150-51.
VI. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, this Court should conclude that the 2001 and subsequent relevant
amendments to IDAHO CODE §§ 18-8302(1) and 18-8310(1) are not retroactive and therefore do
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not run afoul OfIDAHO CODE § 73-101, affirm the district court's decision, and dismiss this case
accordingly.
Dated this

.J- 0

day of July 2012.

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
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DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
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